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CARDOZO AND THE CIVIL JURY 
 
Singularly enough, nearly all legal theory in negligence 
cases is designed to serve the ends of allocating the 
power of judgment respectively to judge and jury.* 
Michael D. Green and Ashley DiMuzio
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
This paper began with an invitation by Professor Sam Levine 
to the senior co-author of this article to participate in the March 2017 
Cardozo Symposium at Touro Law School. After the symposium, the 
junior co-author joined in working remarks made at the symposium 
into this article. Where we use the singular first-person pronoun, we 
refer to the senior co-author, although the work reflected in this article 
is a joint effort. 
I readily accepted Sam’s invitation. I am a torts teacher, and 
Cardozo opinions are ubiquitous in torts casebooks. I have read and 
taught them for many years.1 
 
 
*LEON GREEN, JUDGE AND JURY 261 (1930). 
We cannot say enough about the generosity, kindness, and encouragement provided by 
Professor Andrew Kaufman in assisting us in this project. He has talked with us about our 
ideas, made insightful suggestions about where we might find additional evidence in support 
of our thesis, helped us think through the evidence that we did secure, and assisted us in 
obtaining inaccessible documents that he prepared decades ago during his work on the Cardozo 
biography. All to assist us in disagreeing with a position he took in his Cardozo biography. 
John Goldberg carefully read a draft and made many helpful comments for which we are 
grateful. We also appreciate the assistance of the Special Collections staff at the Harvard Law 
Library, especially Edward Moloy and Jane Kelly in facilitating access to Kaufman’s papers 
prepared during his research efforts for the Cardozo book, and Julianne Claydon, the librarian 
for the New York Court of Appeals, and Jim Folts at the New York State Archives, for 
facilitating access to internal Court of Appeals memoranda authored by Judge Benjamin 
Cardozo. 
1 This paper is limited to Cardozo and the civil jury based on our expertise and the different 
considerations that might exist in one’s attitude about criminal juries and civil juries, although 
we welcome a parallel inquiry into Cardozo and his approach to the criminal jury. We limit 
our consideration to tort cases for reasons of expertise, time, and the fact that tort law is the 
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As I started thinking and reading about Judge Cardozo after a 
bibliography was prepared, I began to appreciate what a daunting task 
I had undertaken and regretted that I had accepted Sam’s kind 
invitation. 
There are six biographies of Cardozo,2 including Andrew 
Kaufman’s definitive biography in 1998. In addition, there are five 
books by Cardozo, four containing his revised academic lectures over 
a decade and numerous miscellaneous speeches delivered over his 
career.3  That work is supplemented by at least three Symposia devoted 
to Cardozo,4 not to mention this one, over 50 memorials or assessments 
of his work in the 1930s,5 countless later articles devoted to him, his 
opinions, his rhetorical style, as well as his views and lectures about 
jurisprudence.6   I despaired of finding something new to say about 
Cardozo—a concern that I imagine my fellow participants in the Touro 
symposium also shared,7 as Joel Goldstein confirmed at the 
symposium, expressing a similar sentiment.8 
 
2 ANDREW L. KAUFMAN, CARDOZO (Harv. Univ. Press 1998); GEORGE S. HELLMAN, 
BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, AMERICAN JUDGE (Whittlesley House, McGraw-Hill 1940);  BERYL 
H. LEVY, CARDOZO AND FRONTIERS OF LEGAL THINKING (Case West. Univ. Press rev. ed. 
1969); RICHARD POLENBERG, THE WORLD OF BENJAMIN CARDOZO (Harv. U. Press 1997); 
JOSEPH POLLARD, MR. JUSTICE CARDOZO: A LIBERAL MIND IN ACTION (The Yorktown Press 
1935); RICHARD A. POSNER, CARDOZO: A STUDY IN REPUTATION (U. Chi. Press 1990). 
3 Four of the books and many of Cardozo’s other speeches are collected in SELECTED 
WRITINGS OF BENJAMIN NATHAN CARDOZO. MARGARET E. HALL, SELECTED WRITINGS OF 
BENJAMIN NATHAN CARDOZO (Matthew Bender; Margaret E. Hall ed., 1967) [hereafter 
“SELECTED WRITINGS”]. The fifth book, a treatise, was written while Cardozo was in practice. 
See BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE JURISDICTION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF 
NEW YORK (2d ed. 1909). 
4 A major symposium, held after Cardozo’s death, was published in parallel in the Harvard 
and Columbia Law Reviews and the Yale Law Journal in January 1939. SELECTED WRITINGS, 
supra note 3, at 432. The initial issue of the Cardozo Law Review was devoted to articles 
about Judge and Justice Cardozo and his work. 1 CARDOZO L. REV. 1 (1979). 
5  See SELECTED WRITINGS, supra note 3, at 430-32. 
6  See id.  
7 The thought also occurred to former Chief Judge Judith Kaye who wrote on the Historical 
Society of the New York Courts website in a short biography of Cardozo: 
Anyone preparing a portrait of Benjamin Nathan Cardozo would necessarily approach 
the task with great trepidation. Already there are so many wonderful writings about 
him, most especially Professor Andrew Kaufman’s 731-page masterpiece, which took 
more than 41 years to complete. Surely, by now everything worth saying (and perhaps 
some that is not) about Cardozo has been said. 
Judith S.  Kaye,  Benjamin  Nathan  Cardozo,  HISTORICAL  SOCIETY  OF  NEW  YORK COURTS, 
available at http://www.nycourts.gov/history/legal-history-new-york/luminaries- court-
appeals/cardozo-benjamin-feature.html 
8 Symposium, Benjamin N. Cardozo - Cardozo and Judicial Decision Making, THE JEWISH 
LAW INSTITUTE AT TOURO COLLEGE JACOB D. FUCHSBERG LAW CENTER (March 23-24, 2017) 
2
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But as I read more, I realized that each of our predecessors who 
addressed Cardozo were influenced by their own vision, values, biases, 
and interests.  And what I have to say today is similarly a product of 
the “total push and pressure of the cosmos”9—as William James put 
it—that I have experienced. 
As a torts teacher, I fervently believe that to understand U.S. 
tort law, one must understand the respective role of judge and jury.  I 
spend a lot of time impressing that view on my students and, before 
the Civil Procedure teachers get their hooks into them with summary 
judgment, judgment as a matter of law, the respective roles of judge 
and jury on matters of fact, law, and mixed questions of fact and law, 
and sufficiency of the evidence, I make them attend to those matters as 
they read torts cases. 
I also believe that our tort law is significantly shaped by the fact 
that we have a jury deciding the vast majority of tort cases.10   By 
contrast, in virtually no other western country is a civil jury employed 
regularly,11 although vestiges still exist in Canada and Great Britain. 
To take a concrete example, “duty,” actually “no-duty,” is 
frequently invoked by judges as a way to avoid leaving the outcome to 
the jury when they think that liability in that case should not be 
imposed.12  By contrast, in other continental legal systems, there is 





9 WILLIAM JAMES, The Present Dilemma in Philosophy, Lecture I, in PRAGMATISM: A NEW 
NAME FOR SOME OLD WAYS OF THINKING (Longman Green and Co. 1907). 
10 Michael D. Green, The Impact of the Jury on American Tort Law, in EUROPEAN TORT LAW 
(2005) (Helmut Koziol & Barbara C. Steininger eds. 2006). 
11 See, e.g., JOHN HENRY MERRYMAN ET AL., THE CIVIL LAW TRADITION: EUROPE, LATIN 
AMERICA, AND EAST ASIA 1014 (1994) (stating that in common law countries other than the 
United States, “the civil jury has been abolished”); NEIL VIDMAR, A HISTORICAL AND 
COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE ON THE COMMON LAW JURY, in WORLD JURY SYSTEMS 1, 3 (Neil 
Vidmar ed., 2000) (“[W]ith the exception of the United States and parts of Canada, the jury 
has been largely abandoned for civil cases. . . .”); RICHARD A. POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS: 
CHALLENGE AND REFORM 193–94 n.1 (1996) (commenting that the abolition of the civil jury 
is “a course that the rest of the civilized world took long ago”). 
12 See, e.g., Posecai v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 752 So. 2d 762 (La. 1999); Packard v. Darveau, 
759 F.3d 897 (8th Cir. 2014). The New York Court of Appeals has been particularly practiced 
at this technique over the years. See, e.g., Strauss v. Belle Realty Co., 482 N.E.2d 34 (N.Y. 
1985); Lauer v. City of New York, 733 N.E.2d 184 (N.Y. 2000); Johnson v. Jamaica Hospital, 
467 N.E.2d 502 (N.Y. 1984). 
13 See W. Jonathan Cardi & Michael D. Green, Duty Wars, 81 S. CAL. L. REV. 671, 701 
(2008) (“[I]t is also notable that Continental tort cases are largely devoid of any analysis of 
duty in imposing liability for negligence. In fact, the presumption of an obligation of care is
3
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Similarly, the demise of a consumer expectations standard in 
strict products liability is largely the result of discomfort about how the 
standard provides virtually no constraints on the jury when it comes to 
how safe a product should be made.14   Yet, the Europeans have, for 30 
years, employed a consumer expectations test without any notable 
difficulty.15   But in Europe, it is judges who are applying the test. 
So, this is the background against which we have formed the 
views expressed in this paper about Cardozo and the jury.  We are 
happy to report that in all of the books about Cardozo, we found only 
one in which there was any coverage of this topic—other books about 
Cardozo did not even have an entry for the jury in their index.16   We 
have read the work of those who knew him and participated in the 
multitude of tributes to him and found nothing in them about Cardozo 
and the civil jury.17 
To us, this is little short of astonishing. The civil jury has long 
been a controversial institution, having come under withering criticism 
by Mark Twain in the 19th Century.18     John Guinther, who examined 
 
so strong that duty is not even an element of a claim for accidental injury.”); see also 
EUROPEAN GROUP ON TORT LAW, PRINCIPLES OF EUROPEAN TORT LAW, IN RESEARCH UNIT FOR 
EUROPEAN TORT LAW, EUROPEAN CENTRE OF TORT AND INSURANCE LAW, UNIFICATION OF 
TORT LAW: FAULT 369, 372 (Pierre Widmer ed., 2005); see also William L. Prosser, Palsgraf 
Revisited, 52 MICH. L. REV. 1, 12 (1953) (stating that “the concept [of duty] is unknown to the 
continental law”). 
14 See Bruce Feldthusen et al., Product Liability in North America, in PRODUCT LIABILITY: 
FUNDAMENTAL QUESTIONS OF PRODUCT LIABILITY IN A COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE (Helmut 
Koziol et al., eds., forthcoming 2017) (“Courts and commentators became concerned about the 
indeterminacy of the consumer expectations test for these kinds of cases and the concomitant 
unconstrained discretion it afforded juries.”); Mary J. Davis, Design Defect Liability: In 
Search of a Standard of Responsibility, 39 WAYNE L. REV 1217, 1236-37 (1993) (explaining 
dissatisfaction with the consumer expectations test for design defect claims). 
15 See Willem H. Van Boom et al., Product Liability in Europe, in PRODUCT LIABILITY: 
FUNDAMENTAL QUESTIONS IN A COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 253 (Helmut Koziol et al., eds. De 
Gruyter 2017). 
16 See supra note 2. Pollard mentions the jury only in the context of explaining Wagner                 
v. International Railway Co., 133 N.E. 437 (N.Y. 1921), in which Judge Cardozo held that 
rescuers were foreseeable as a matter of law and therefore the case had to be submitted to the 
jury, the issue of the right to jury trial in connection with injunctions to quell public nuisances, 
and with regard to arbitration agreements. None of these authors, save for Professor Kaufman, 
have written a single word about Cardozo’s views on the jury and its appropriate role in 
deciding civil cases. 
17 There is such an enormous amount written about Cardozo both during his lifetime and in 
memoriam. We have not read it all, but we have read all of the material that seemed most 
likely to contain a discussion of Cardozo and the jury. 
18 “The jury system puts a ban upon intelligence and honesty, and a premium upon ignorance, 
stupidity and perjury. It is a shame that we must continue to use a worthless system 
4
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the jury in America more recently reflected: “[F]or each advocate of 
the jury throughout its long history in America, there seems to                 
have been a matching opponent.”19   During Cardozo’s era, there was 
considerable academic attention to the matter. Leon Green, a 
contemporary of Cardozo’s, published a book in 1930 entitled Judge 
and Jury.20 
The one text21 containing a discussion of Cardozo and his 
relationship to the jury did not dissuade us from this topic.  Because we 
don’t agree with that author’s assessment, we are left a little sliver of 
room to say something in this article about Cardozo that has not been 
said previously. 
To lay out our thesis, we find that Cardozo demonstrated little 
respect for the jury in the opinions that he wrote,22 and he felt little 
reluctance to infringe on its factfinding role in a tort case when it suited 
his purposes.  He would not only find the historical facts at issue based 
on his reading of the appellate record, even when the jury could 
reasonably have found them otherwise, but also make the normative 
judgment about whether the defendant (or plaintiff) acted reasonably 
and whether the harm that occurred was within the defendant’s scope 
of liability, known more popularly as proximate cause, two of the 





because it was good a thousand years ago.”   MARK TWAIN, ROUGHING IT 247 (Am. Pub. & 
F.G. Gilman & Co. 1872). 
19  See JOHN GUINTHER, THE JURY IN AMERICA xiii (Harper & Row 1988); see also Douglas 
G. Smith, Structural and Functional Aspects of the Jury: Comparative Analysis and Proposals 
for Reform, 48 ALA. L. REV. 441, 444 (1997) (“[T]he civil jury has come under attack as an 
archaic institution that has outlived its usefulness. . . .”); Michael D. Green, The Impact of the 
Civil Jury on American Tort Law, 38 PEPP. L. REV. 337, 340 n.18 (2011). 
20  GREEN, supra note*. 
21 The only other discussion of anything approaching this issue, and it is quite peripheral, is 
an article on the difference between law and fact in workers’ compensation and its application 
to whether an injury “arose out of employment.” The author used the difference between 
Cardozo and Andrews in Palsgraf to explain how authority between judge and jury is 
allocated. See Kenneth Vinson, Disentangling Law and Fact: Echoes of Proximate Cause in 
the Workers’ Compensation Coverage Formula, 47 ALA. L. REV. 723, 754 (1996) (“The real 
battle in Palsgraf . . . was whether judge or jury should determine if the scope of railroad 
liability should be extended to cover cases such as Palsgraf’s.”). 
22 The qualification “in the opinions he wrote” is an important one. Cardozo penned internal 
court memoranda recommending to his fellow judges that an appeal be affirmed without 
opinion. Those memoranda, as we discuss infra text accompanying notes 152-59 reveal a 
different picture from that which we describe in Cardozo’s published opinions. 
23  RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM § 29 cmt. q 
(Am. Law Inst. 2012). 
5
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By contrast, Andrew Kaufman concludes that “Cardozo was 
assiduous in protecting the role of the jury,”24 although he adds that 
Cardozo “did not hesitate to take an issue away from the jury when his 
reading of a record convinced him that the factual issue should be 
decided only one way.”25 
We don’t find Cardozo being assiduous with regard to the 
jury’s role—rather Cardozo displayed little regard for the jury’s role 
in tort cases, at least those in which he took sufficient interest to write 
an opinion. 
Instead, Cardozo acted as a super-juror, reading the record  and 
making his own independent judgments.  When those judgments 
concurred with the jury’s conclusion, he would affirm its decision. But 
when he disagreed, he felt free to overturn the decision through a 
variety of devices.  He was perfectly willing to find facts consistent 
with his view of the case, regardless of whether the jury might have 
come to a different – yet reasonable – conclusion about them. 
Ironically, we are buoyed in this conclusion by a statement that Andy 
 
24 KAUFMAN, supra note 2, at 255. No support is cited for this statement, but a page earlier 
Kaufman writes that Cardozo frequently supported affirmance of an appeal based on there 
being sufficient evidence to support the jury’s determination. Id. at 253. In communications 
with him, he stated that the memoranda cited on that matter were the basis for his assessment 
of Cardozo’s approach to the jury. 
25 Id. at 255-56. Kaufman’s qualification on his assiduous protector assessment might be 
interpreted in at least two ways. One is that Cardozo removed a matter from the jury when no 
reasonable jury could find otherwise. That is the well-accepted standard for when a factual 
matter becomes a legal one for the court to decide. The second interpretation is that when 
Cardozo’s reading of the record persuaded him about the proper outcome of a disputed matter, 
he substituted his judgment for that of the jury. The second interpretation is consistent with 
our thesis but is incompatible with Kaufman’s assiduous-protector tenet. We should add that 
Kaufman, a couple of pages later, wrote more on Cardozo and the jury: 
Cardozo was confident in this ability to read case records and decide when 
a factual issue was sufficiently clear that it should be decided by the court 
and not by a jury. He recognized the potential danger of substituting his 
judgment for that of the jury. “If courts are to resist the present tendency 
to substitute administrative agencies for the common law tribunals, they 
must be ready to accredit to the triers of the acts a reasonable equipment 
of common sense and conscience.” But he did overturn jury verdicts in a 
moderate number of cases. He saw that as his job. 
Id. at 257. The quoted language is from an internal court memorandum that Cardozo wrote. 
Id. at 645 n.36. Once again, it is part of a judge’s job to determine whether the party with the 
burden of proof has met her burden of production and whether the evidence in a case permits 
a reasonable determination by the jury. It is not the court’s role to find or make inferences 
about the facts that are different from the ones made by the jury and it is not the court’s job in 
substitute its judgment for the jury’s on mixed questions, such as negligence, that are assigned 
to the jury. As we lay out in the remainder of this article, we think that is precisely what Judge 
Cardozo did in a substantial number of tort opinions he  penned. 
6
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Kaufman made while one of us was in Cambridge looking at notes he 
had taken while conducting research at the archives of the New York 
Court of Appeals.  Andy observed that with 23 years of practice, the 
largest portion doing appellate work, and his considerable self- 
confidence, Cardozo was comfortable that he could read an appellate 
record and determine for himself what had occurred.26  Cardozo was 
also comfortable with substituting his judgement for the jury’s on 
mixed questions of fact and law such as negligence or scope of 
liability.27 
This article proceeds first to examine several of Cardozo’s torts 
opinions, some famous, some not, over the span of his career as a judge 
and Justice. All of the cases analyzed are cases that implicate the jury’s 
role in making factual determinations, and on appeal at least one issue 
involved the question of whether there was sufficient evidence (or 
allegations in the complaint) for the jury’s determination. This 
examination reveals what we believe is Cardozo’s cavalier approach 
to the jury’s role. In the process, Cardozo largely ignored the 
procedural posture of the case and the implications for how an 
appellate court should approach its role in the appeal.28 After 
canvassing those cases, the article turns to how other judges on the 
Court of Appeals treated these same matters in opinions they authored 
during the period that Cardozo served on the Court of Appeals.  Finally, 
we assess internal Court of Appeals memoranda prepared by Cardozo 
for his fellow judges that recommended affirming cases without an 
opinion or denying a discretionary appeal.29 
 
26 Conversation between Andrew L. Kaufman and Michael D. Green, Cambridge, Mass. 
(July 13, 2017). See also KAUFMAN, supra note 2, at 254 (“While Cardozo had a strong respect 
for the work of the judge and jury of the trial court, he brought from his own legal practice a 
confidence in his own ability to grasp particular factual settings and he applied that skill to the 
interpretation of . . . case records.”). 
27 Kaufman acknowledges this aspect of Cardozo’s judging as well, describing his 
“occasional unwillingness to leave a matter to the jury . . . as part of the business of judging to 
keep a jury from being swayed by sympathy when the record indicated that there was no factual 
issue that ought to be submitted to it.” See KAUFMAN, supra note 2, at 257. Our contention, of 
course, goes beyond this: Cardozo intervened even when the record well supported the jury’s 
determination. 
28 As well, this would include determinations of mixed questions of law and fact that are 
assigned to the jury, such as negligence. When no reasonable jury could find in a particular 
way on such a question, the matter becomes one of law for the court. See, e.g., Burns v. 
Wilkinson, 126 N.E. 513 (N.Y. 1920) (an excellent example of one of Cardozo’s judicial 
brethren acknowledging the standard of review). 
29 We address these memoranda because they constitute the evidence supporting Andy 
Kaufman’s assessment that Cardozo was “assiduous in protecting the role of the jury.” See 
Kaufman, supra note 2, at 253 n.26. 
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II. ASSESSING JUDGE CARDOZO’S OPINIONS 
 
Preliminarily, it is important to appreciate that at the time 
Cardozo was a member of the Court of Appeals, sufficiency review 
was similar to what it is today.  Facts were for the jury to determine,30 
and if the procedural posture of the case involved an appeal based on 
the insufficiency of the evidence, the court was obliged to take all the 
facts and inferences therefrom as favorable to the verdict winner.31   The 
situation was similar for motions to dismiss the complaint and for 
summary judgment. Although various verbal formulas were batted 
about for what evidence (or allegations) would be sufficient, including 
“only a scintilla of evidence,” “no evidence,” “no substantial 
evidence,” and “no credible evidence,”32 the inquiry was similar to 
sufficiency analysis as we know it today. 
There is one quirk of the Court of Appeals’ appellate 
jurisdiction as a result of constitutional provisions addressing the same 
that requires mention. Until 1926, the court was barred from reviewing 
the sufficiency of the evidence if the Appellate Division had ruled 
unanimously on the matter.33  After the 1925 revisions to the New York 
Constitution, the Court of Appeals’ review of sufficiency matters was 
expanded to include cases in which the Appellate Division had 
unanimously reversed the trial court’s determination of sufficiency.34 
We begin with an obscure torts opinion of Cardozo’s, Perry v. 
Rochester Lime Co.,35 which was published only two years after Judge 
Cardozo joined the Court of Appeals. Judge Cardozo’s opinion starts 
with a paragraph of facts about the case.36  Defendant stored dynamite 
 
 
30 Although the Appellate Division might review then to determine if a motion for a new trial 
was properly granted or denied. HENRY COHEN, THE POWERS OF THE NEW YORK COURT OF 
APPEALS § 124 (Baker Voorhis & Co. 1934). 
31 See id. at 344 (“The Court of Appeals assumes that those facts were found which support 
the conclusion, in the absence of evidence to the contrary.”). Or, on a motion for summary 
judgment, in favor of the party against whom summary judgment was sought. See also id. at 
346 n.50 (“The question of law whether there is any evidence to sustain the verdict must be 
answered by inquiry, not into what the jury did find, but what it might have found under the 
charge. The language is familiar that ‘the jury might have believed this bit of testimony and 
rejected that, and the conclusion is that, a question of fact existing, the questions of law 
asserted to exist are not shown to exist.”). 
32  Id. at 312-13 n.53. 
33  See id. at § 103, p. 296. 
34  Id. at § 104, p. 298. 
35  113 N.E. 529 (N.Y. 1916). 
36  Id. 
8
Touro Law Review, Vol. 34 [2018], No. 1, Art. 13
https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol34/iss1/13
2018 CARDOZO AND THE CIVIL JURY 191 
 
 
on the banks of the Erie Canal.37  It did so in an unlocked box in a public 
place and in violation of an ordinance.38  Two boys found the dynamite, 
stole a container containing considerable firepower, and the next day, 
while moving the explosives, accidentally set them off, killing 
themselves and a boy of eight who was tagging along with the two 
older boys.39 This suit was only about the eight-year old’s death.40 
After acknowledging that defendant was negligent in violating 
the ordinance, the issue of proximate cause arose.41   Judge Cardozo in 
the meat of his opinion then explained why the harm was not 
reasonably foreseeable, emphasizing the wrongdoing of the boys who 
had stolen the explosives and concluded: The decedent’s “death was 
not the proximate result of the open chest in the highway,”42 failing to 
acknowledge (surely Cardozo understood) that the law does not 
demand that a single proximate cause be identified and that there can 
be multiple such causes.43 
Our main point is that nowhere does Judge Cardozo tell us the 
procedural posture of the case.  What happened below is critical to the 
appropriate scope of the appellate court’s review, but the opinion is 
entirely silent about the matter.44  It is as if Judge Cardozo is deciding 
this case as both trier of fact and law in the first instance. That, of 
course, was not the case.  The trial judge had non-suited the plaintiff, 
and the Appellate Division affirmed unanimously without an 
opinion,45 so the proper issue was whether there was sufficient 
evidence for a reasonable jury to find defendant’s negligence to be a 
proximate cause of the child’s death. 
Reasonable judges might disagree on that matter, but Judge 
Cardozo avoided such consideration by ignoring the procedural 
posture and the role of the jury and stating the facts as immutable 
without recognizing the range of facts that a jury might have found. By 
 
37  Id. 
38  Id. 
39  Id. 
40 Perry, 113 N.E. at 529. 
41 Id. at 530. 
42 Id. It is the case that Cardozo used the phrase “proximate result” rather than “proximate 
cause” but the former phrase has no legal meaning and, in context, he could only have meant 
proximate cause. 
43 Sweet v. Perkins, 90 N.E. 50, 51 (N.Y. 1909) (“There may be more than one proximate 
cause of an accident, if each of the causes asserted can be seen to have been an efficient one, 
without which the injury resulting would not have been sustained.”). 
44  Perry, 113 N.E. 529 (N.Y. 1916). 
45  Perry v. Rochester Lime Co., 147 N.Y.S. 1136 (App. Div. 1914). 
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doing so, he managed also to dodge the prohibition on the Court of 
Appeals reviewing sufficiency matters when the Appellate Division 
ruled unanimously on the question.46 
Perry is also useful as a prelude to Palsgraf,47 as it demonstrates 
that the concept of proximate cause was alive and well in New York in 
the early twentieth century.  Indeed, the Court of Appeals had been 
using this concept to limit liability as far back as the mid-nineteenth 
century.48 
Let us fast forward a dozen years to Palsgraf, which according 
to Dean Prosser, is “perhaps the most celebrated of all torts cases.”49 
Let us begin with the facts, well not all of the facts, but the 
distance of Ms. Palsgraf to the pushing and pulling of the two 
passengers. Numerous commentators have addressed the matter of 
how far Ms. Palsgraf and the falling scales were from the train and the 
fireworks that exploded.50  Judge Posner complains that Cardozo’s 
facts were “slanted” and that he “[made up facts.]”51 Professor 
Kaufman concludes that “Cardozo’s characterization of Ms. Palsgraf’s 
location did have a basis in the record.”52   Yet, other testimony in the 
case would have supported a conclusion that she was much closer to 
the incident than Cardozo implies.53 
The actual distance is not important. What is important is that 





46 See supra text accompanying notes 33-34. To be fair, as John Goldberg urged us, 
proximate cause is an issue that courts have long deferred to juries less than they do for the 
other judgmental, yet denominated-factual, matter of negligence. 
47   Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R. Co., 162 N.E. 99 (N.Y. 1928). 
48   Ryan v. New York Cent. R.R. Co., 35 N.Y. 210-11 (1866). 
49 William L. Prosser, Palsgraf Revisited, 52 MICH. L. REV. 1, 1 (1953). To stay focused on 
our thesis and exercising heroic self-restraint—we will desist from criticizing the substance of 
the opinion, already admirably accomplished by the late Gary Schwartz. See Gary T. Schwartz, 
Cardozo as Tort Lawmaker, 49 DEPAUL L. REV. 305 (1999). 
50 See, e.g., William H. Manz, Palsgraf: Cardozo’s Urban Legend?, 107 DICK. L. REV. 785, 
788 (2003) (“Cardozo’s impossible version of event has proved remarkably resistant to 
criticism or correction.”); cf. VICTOR E. SCHWARTZ ET AL., PROSSER, WADE AND SCHWARTZ’S 
TORTS: CASES & MATERIALS 327 (Foundation Press 12th ed. 2010) (identifying discrepancies 
between the record and Cardozo’s recitation of the facts). 
51 POSNER, supra note 2 at 38. Another commentator who delved deeply into the record and 
other sources, concludes that “it is difficult not to conclude that the statement of facts was 
crafted to support the result.” Manz, supra note 50, at 816–17. 
52   KAUFMAN, supra note 2, at 298. 
53   Manz, supra note 50. 
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were the factfinder in the case, rather than acknowledging that, on the 
mixed evidence, the jury’s job was to determine the distance.54 
Moreover, given the jury verdict for the plaintiff, Judge 
Cardozo’s role was to defer to what the jury might have found, not to 
decide the facts de novo on appeal.55  There can be no doubt that 
Cardozo knew his role. Cardozo himself wrote “all facts warranted by 
the evidence will be deemed to have been found in favor of the 
successful party” in a treatise he authored on New York procedure 
while discussing the role of the appellate court in appeals of jury 
verdict.56 
This phenomenon of stating the facts without a hint of 
deference to what the jury might have found based on the record in the 
case repeatedly occurs in Cardozo opinions.57  Another example of this 
appellate factfinding by Cardozo occurred in Adams v. Bullock.58  That 
case involved a young boy who was electrocuted and burned when the 
wire he was swinging came in contact with the defendant-trolley’s 
electrified wires. To read Judge Cardozo’s opinion, one would think 
that there was nothing, save extraordinary measures, available to avoid 
the accident.  A student author, who read the trial transcript in the case, 
states that the court’s outcome, reversing the judgment for the plaintiff, 
was strengthened by telling a story that was “not clearly supported by 
the underlying record”59 with regard to available precautions.  To 
borrow the Cardozian style, Economy of opinions this does serve; but 
respecting the role of the jury it does not. 
The effect of Palsgraf’s adopting foreseeability as the test to 
determine whether a duty is owed to the plaintiff—the risk reasonably 
perceived defines the duty to be obeyed—rendered duty a matter  that 
 
54  Andrew L. Kaufman, Benjamin Cardozo as Paradigmatic Tort Lawmaker, 49 DEPAUL  L. 
REV. 281, 291-92 (1999). 
55 Thus, we disagree with Professor Kaufman who concluded that the blame is on the 
plaintiff’s lawyer for not nailing down the distance from the train to the weighing scale. 
KAUFMAN, supra note 2, at 297. The plaintiff’s lawyer convinced the jury it was close enough 
to impose liability. What the plaintiff’s lawyer didn’t do was convince Judge Cardozo, a 
burden that, if the role of the jury were respected, would not exist. 
56   BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE JURISDICTION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF 
NEW YORK 88 at § 59 (2d ed. 1909). 
57 As Kaufman puts it, after referring to a number of Cardozo’s opinions, he “came away 
from reading the record with such a confident vision of the facts that he concluded that there 
was nothing to submit to a jury.” KAUFMAN, supra note 2, at 298-99. 
58   125 N.E. 93 (N.Y. 1919). 
59 Elizabeth Smallwood, A First-Year Tort Law Institution: Adams v. Bullock 30 (2004) 
(unpublished student paper), available at http://www.law.berkeley.edu/sugarman/adamsfinal- 
1.doc. 
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relies heavily on the facts of each case.  Some commentators claim that 
Palsgraf is, in the end, not that important to tort law.60   Judge Posner 
claims that notwithstanding Palsgraf’s treating unforeseeable 
plaintiffs as a matter of duty, “Most states continue to muddle along 
with the nebulous ‘proximate cause’ approach. . . .”61
Professor Kaufman expressed the view that Palsgraf was 
merely a matter of torts taxonomy: would unforeseeability of plaintiffs 
be dealt with as a matter of duty as Cardozo held62 or as a matter of 
proximate cause, as argued by Andrews?63 
But much rides on where we situate this issue. Duty is a matter 
of law for the court; proximate cause64 is for the jury.  Duty, as a matter 
of law, is a general rule of law applicable broadly to all cases falling 
60 See Richard A. Epstein, Two Fallacies in the Law of Joint Torts, 73 GEO. L.J. 1377 (1985) 
(“[T]he case does not matter. It is a sport: its freakish facts ensure that it will not be repeated, 
and no matter how general its language, the case will have (as has in fact been the case) no 
precedential importance.”); WILLIAM L. PROSSER & YOUNG B. SMITH, CASES AND MATERIALS
ON TORTS 361 (4th ed. 1967) (“Although the Palsgraf Case has been cited a good many 
hundreds of times on the general proposition that there must be duty before there can be 
negligence, it appears actually to be of a good deal more theoretical interest than practical 
importance. Case have been few and far between in which parallel facts, of direct causation of 
harm to the unforeseeable plaintiff can be found.”). Professor Jonathan Cardi also adverts to 
this view: “Because a majority of courts render fact-specific plaintiff-foreseeability rulings, 
one might argue that whether duty or proximate cause is the proper home for plaintiff- 
foreseeability is no longer of particular relevance to tort law.” W. Jonathan Cardi, The Hidden 
Legacy of Palsgraf: Modern Duty Law in Microcosm, 91 B.U. L. REV. 1873, 1897 (2011). 
Professor Thomas Cowan, in an early commentary on Palsgraf, identified and criticized its 
effect of specifying duty, a rule of law, at such a factually detailed level that it is limited to a 
ticket for a single ride on the duty railroad. Thomas F. Cowan, The Riddle of the Palsgraf Case, 
23 MINN. L. REV. 46, 58 (1938-39). 
61 POSNER, supra note 2, at 41. Recent scholarship casts doubt on Judge Posner’s assessment. 
See infra notes 69-71 and accompanying text. 
62 It is worth noting that Cardozo’s turn to duty raised an issue that the defendant had never 
argued and which was never presented to the court. See Points for Appellant, Palsgraf v. 
Long Island R.R., 248 N.Y. 339 (1928); Plaintiff-Respondent’s Brief, Palsgraf v. Long 
Island R.R., 248 N.Y. 339 (1928) (both on file with authors). John Goldberg expressed to us 
the view that, in the end, Cardozo did act to affirm the jury by not overturning the jury’s 
finding of negligence, a matter on which a number of commentators have questioned. We are 
not in agreement, accepting the jury verdict was merely a means to enable Cardozo to write 
an opinion on an issue that had been the subject of extensive debate in the drafting of the first 
Restatement of Torts. See KAUFMAN, supra note 2, at 287-95. We believe that if, in order to 
write an opinion on an issue that was important for the day and might have lasting 
significance, overturning a jury’s finding was the way to do it, Cardozo would have had no 
reluctance to do so. 
63   KAUFMAN, supra note 2, at 301 & 302-03. 
64 Although a mixed question of law and fact, proximate cause is categorized as a factual 
matter for the jury. 
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within its scope,65 while proximate cause is about the specific facts of 
the case and whether defendant’s liability, given negligence, harm, and 
circumstances surrounding them, extends to plaintiff’s harm.66 
However, foreseeability is a matter that depends on the specific 
facts of the case: if Ms. Palsgraf had been standing next to the guards 
when they were pushing the passenger on the train, she would have 
been a foreseeable plaintiff.  A few feet away, maybe not so clearly, 
but a judgment that, in the first instance is for the jury.  So Palsgraf 
puts the judge in the role of deciding foreseeability in the specific 
context of that case, requiring attention to the facts of the case in doing 
so, even when the relevant facts are in dispute.67  As Professors 
Goldberg and Zipursky have observed, “When courts find themselves 
talking about “duty” at a very high level of specificity, they may well 
be talking not about duty at all, but about breach.”68  Yes, or about 
proximate cause. 
Judge Cardozo does, it is true, recognize the role of the jury in 
Palsgraf, acknowledging that when foreseeability is subject to 
conflicting inferences, the question is for the jury. Professor Jonathan 
Cardi recently did an exhaustive 51-state survey of the impact of 
Palsgraf on modern tort law.69   He found that, among states he could 
classify, the Palsgraf duty approach overwhelmingly prevailed over 
proximate cause by an 8-1 ratio.70   He also found an almost even   split 
among jurisdictions with regard to accepting Judge Cardozo’s 
 
65 RESTATEMENT, supra note 23, at § 7, cmt. a (“[N]o duty rules are matters of law decided 
by the courts. . . .”); Cowan, supra note 60, at 55. 
66   See RESTATEMENT, supra note 23, at § 29. 
67 Professor Seavey remarked on this shift in authority, apparently approvingly, as it gave 
“the court greater control of the case.” Warren Seavey, Mr. Justice Cardozo and the Law of 
Torts, 52 HARV. L. REV. 372, 383 n.17 (1938-39). See also Cowan, supra note 60, at 54-55. 
68  John C. P. Goldberg & Benjamin C. Zipurski, The Restatement (Third) and the Place of 
Duty in Negligence Law, 54 VAND. L. REV. 657, 717 (2001). Professor Cowan, attempting to 
formulate a rule to be derived from Palsgraf, illustrates this specificity well: 
[A] railroad does not owe to an intending passenger the duty to refrain 
from permitting its guards to push upon a moving train another passenger 
carrying a package which, though innocent in appearance, contains 
fireworks, and which, if joggled from the boarding passenger’s arm, will 
fall to the tracks, explode, shake the platform, knock down the scales, and 
thus injure the intending passenger. 
Cowan, supra note 60, at 56 
69 See Cardi, supra note 60, at 1901-13. 
70 See Cardi, supra note 60, at 1890-92 (“On this score, Cardozo has clearly won the day. 
When faced with the issue, thirty-three (of fifty-one) courts hold with fair consistency that 
whether the plaintiff was a foreseeable victim is a question to be decided in the duty context. 
Only four jurisdictions clearly follow Judge Andrews in holding that plaintiff-foreseeability is 
properly and solely a matter for proximate cause.”). 
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qualification that the jury should decide foreseeability when in dispute 
for duty purposes.  Half of them adhere to the classical view that duty 
is a matter for the court and therefore it displaces the jury in deciding 
foreseeability.71 
Another case, one in which Judge Cardozo issued one of his 
infrequent dissents,72 again reveals his attitude about inconvenient 
facts.  Although a tort case, the issue was a procedural one: whether in 
a wrongful death suit, a claim against an initial tortfeasor who caused 
plaintiff’s decedent injury in erecting a picket fence could be joined 
with a claim against the physician who treated plaintiff’s decedent.73   
The majority ruled that they could not, relying in part on the fact that 
under existing joinder rules, inconsistent claims could not be joined.74   
Dissenting, Cardozo took the common-sense position that 
a negligent tortfeasor is not relieved of liability because 
the injury has been aggravated by the malpractice of a 
surgeon . . . ; that the two causes of action are therefore 
not inconsistent, since proof of the one will not exclude 
the other, but both may coexist; that each of the 
defendants has thus contributed to a single casualty, 
which is the subject of action, i.e., the death of the 
child.75 
The only difficulty with Judge Cardozo’s view is that his 
version of the case does not match the facts alleged in the complaint. 
The majority opinion reports that plaintiff’s claim was that the initial 
tortfeasor’s negligence “solely caused” the death of plaintiff’s 
decedent.76   Meanwhile the claim against the physician alleged that he 
“so negligently treated him [the decedent] that, solely by reason of such 
negligent treatment, intestate died.”77   While each of the alleged 
tortfeasors could be a cause of death (Cardozo’s version) that scenario 
was just not what the plaintiff alleged.78  While this shaping of the facts 
 
71  Cardi, supra note 60,  at 1901. 
72  See Bernard L. Shientag, The Opinions and Writings of Judge Benjamin N. Cardozo, 30 
COL. L. REV. 597, 606 (“Judge Cardozo has written few dissenting opinions.”). 
73  Ader v. Blau, 148 N.E. 771 (N.Y. 1925). 
74  Id. at 775. 
75  Id. 
76  Id. at 772. 
77  Id. 
78 Of course, it may be that the majority had the facts wrong, and Cardozo had them right. 
But if that were the case, we would have expected Cardozo to highlight that difference and 
cite to the record to reveal the majority’s mistake (or, better yet, convince the majority of  the 
14
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did not implicate any jury determination, it does reveal a willingness 
to ignore an inconvenient set of facts in order to reach what Cardozo 
deemed the best result.79 
Given his intellect, this difference in the factual premises 
between Cardozo and the majority could not have escaped his notice. 
That he was also the sole dissenter suggests that other judges on the 
court appreciated that Cardozo was writing an opinion applicable to a 
different set of facts. Perhaps Cardozo was anxious to make the joinder 
point for the much more common situation80 of a plaintiff who alleges 
the initial harm caused by the first accident was aggravated by the 
malpractice of the physician. There is no inconsistency in those claims 
and, under New York’s then-existing joinder rules, could properly be 
joined. 
Greene v. Sibley81 is another much-commented-on case in 
which Judge Cardozo wrote an opinion reflecting his view that the 
defendant had not been negligent.82 What Cardozo neglected to 
mention was the contrary jury determination, although he did add the 
offhand statement: “We find no evidence of negligence.”83 Yet, surely 
 
 
accuracy of his account of the facts before decision was rendered). Cardozo said nothing about 
the discrepancy in the factual accounts in his dissent. 
79 On this matter, Cardozo turned out to be right. The provision barring joinder of inconsistent 
claims was repealed by the New York Legislature ten years later. See Great N. Tel. Co. v. 
Yokohama Specie Bank, 76 N.E.2d 117, 120 (N.Y. 1947). 
80 Indeed, one might wonder why plaintiff’s lawyer insisted on making inconsistent claims, 
such that plaintiff could logically prevail in only one of them, at least if they were joined in 
the same case. The reason why plaintiff’s lawyer structured the claim in this inconsistent 
manner may stem from the allocation of the burden of proof on aggravation at the time of 
Ader. At that time, when one defendant caused some harm to plaintiff and another defendant 
aggravated the harm, the burden of proof to show the magnitude of harm that was caused 
before the aggravation and after was on the plaintiff. Not until the middle of the twentieth 
century did courts begin to shift the burden of proof to defendants. See RESTATEMENT, supra 
note 23, at § 26, cmt. h & Rptrs. Note (Am. Law Inst. 2010). Thus, at the time of Ader, it may 
have been strategically advantageous to make inconsistent claims when plaintiff could not 
show the magnitude of harm caused by each of the initial tortfeasor and the aggravating 
tortfeasor. 
81   177 N.E. 416 (N.Y. 1931). 
82 We find ourselves in disagreement with Andy Kaufman about Greene as well. Andy’s 
view is that Cardozo felt the plaintiff had an obligation to look out for herself: “The customer 
should simply have looked where she was going.” KAUFMAN, supra note 2, at 257. Whether 
the plaintiff looked out for herself or not bears on her own contributory negligence not the 
defendant’s negligence. The jury had resolved both negligence by the defendant and the 
plaintiff’s contributory negligence in favor of the plaintiff, as the Appellate Division 
explained. Greene v. Sibley, Lindsay & Curr Co., 248 N.Y.S. 491 (App. Div. 1931). Judge 
Cardozo’s opinion said nothing about plaintiff’s negligence. 
83   Greene, 177 N.E. at 417. 
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within his own recitation of facts was evidence of negligence: the 
workman on whose leg plaintiff had tripped neglected to warn the 
plaintiff after he suddenly shifted his position to his knee so that his 
leg was extended into the aisle behind the plaintiff.84  She had seen him 
working to her side before he was a threat, then turned to the counter 
to receive change for her purchase and did not see him change 
position.85  Interestingly, Cardozo’s rendition of the facts differed in 
nuanced but significant ways from the Appellate Division, which had, 
3-2, affirmed the judgment entered based on the jury verdict.86 
In similar fashion, Cardozo’s opinion in MacPherson v. Buick 




84  Id. 
85  Id. 
86  The Appellate Division wrote: 
The jury was warranted in finding that plaintiff, having made a 
purchase at a counter in defendant’s store, stood there facing the counter 
waiting for her package and change. Hearing a voice just to her right, she 
turned her head, and saw two of defendant’s employees talking together 
about a cash register located on the counter in front of them and just to the 
right of plaintiff. 
The cash register was temporarily out of repair, and the employee 
standing next to plaintiff had just come there to find out what the trouble 
was. Plaintiff’s look disclosed this man standing upright immediately next 
to her, in front of the counter where the cash register stood. At that moment 
the clerk returned with the package and change. Plaintiff turned to her left 
to take them. Then, within a second or so, having in mind the position of 
the man as she had just noticed it, she turned to her right— intending to 
make ‘a sweep around him standing there’—and stepped out with her left 
foot. During the second or so, which those acts of plaintiff occupied, the 
man changed his position by dropping down on one knee— his left knee—
in order to look across the surface of the counter and under the cash 
register. In that position, his left leg stretched out along the floor behind 
him ‘the length of his knee to his foot or heel,’ estimated by plaintiff as 
being two feet. As plaintiff swung and stepped—intending to sweep 
around him—the outstretched leg caught her foot and she was thrown. 
Greene v. Sibley, Lindsay & Curr Co., 248 N.Y.S. 491, 491 (App. Div. 1931), rev’d, 177 N.E. 
416 (N.Y. 1931). 
By contrast, in his opinion, Cardozo does not mention the one-second gap between the 
time plaintiff observed the workman posing no threat and when she turned to leave and tripped 
over his newly outstretched leg. Cardozo also questioned the plaintiff’s credibility, adding the 
editorial comment “so she says,” to his relating her testimony that she thought, upon turning, 
that he was in the same position as he had been a second before. And, conspicuously absent 
from Cardozo’s statement of the facts, as was so often the case, was the Appellate Division’s 
introduction to the facts: “The jury was warranted in finding . . . .” Id. at 492. 
87   217 N.Y. 382 (1916). 
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version than that of the Appellate Division.88  Jim Henderson opines 
that the reason was to tee up an opinion that would overturn a privity 
rule whose time for banishment had come.  Although this slanting of 
the facts had no impact on the jury’s findings, it does reveal a judge 
willing to state the facts in a fashion to further other purposes. 
Before concluding this discussion, we have one more example, 
the colloquially known “Flopper” case.89 The Flopper was an amusement 
ride on which a young man, on a date with the woman who became his 
wife, fell and suffered a fractured kneecap.90  And, no doubt, 
considerable bruising of his pride. (Alas, lost pride is not a legally 
compensable injury—but a fracture is). The ride consisted of an 
inclined, smartly-moving belt that made remaining on one’s feet 
difficult.91 
Judge Cardozo adopted a robust assumption of risk doctrine to 
dismiss the plaintiff’s claim, but the dignity-damaged plaintiff had one 
last hope to preserve the jury verdict he had received below: he had 
testified that right after alighting on the machine and just before he fell, 
the Flopper executed a sudden and unexpected jerk.92 Such a 
malfunction by the machine might be the basis for a determination of 
negligence and a risk of which the plaintiff was not aware.93 
Judge Cardozo was having none of it. Rejecting the plaintiff’s 
factual claim that the belt performed improperly when it suddenly 
jerked, Cardozo wrote: 
One who steps upon a moving belt and finds his heels 
above his head is in no position to discriminate                 
with nicety between the successive stages of the shock,  
between  the jerk which is a cause and the jerk,  
 
88 MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 145 N.Y.S. 462 (App. Div. 1914), aff’d, 111 N.E. 1050 
(1916). MacPherson, it is true, did not overturn a jury verdict that Professor Henderson claims 
is at least questionable. However, at the time of MacPherson, the Court of Appeals was 
constitutionally barred from reviewing factual matters that had been affirmed unanimously by 
the Appellate Division, which was what the Appellate Division had done. See supra notes 33-
34 & accompanying text. 
89  Murphy v. Steeplechase Amusement Co., 166 N.E. 173 (N.Y. 1929). 
90   Id. at 173-75. 
91   Id. at 173. 
92   Id. at 174. 
93 Cardozo also claimed that even if the Flopper did execute a spasm, it would make no 
difference. Id. at 174 (“But the jerk, if it were established, would add little to the case. Whether 
the movement of the belt was uniform or irregular, the risk at greatest was a fall.”). That 
assessment seems incorrect. Risk reflects the potential magnitude of harm discounted by the 
probability of its occurring. If the Flopper jerked, the probability of falling and injuring oneself 
would be increased, a risk of which the plaintiff would not have known and therefor assumed. 
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accompanying the fall, as an instantaneous effect. 
There is evidence for the defendant that power was 
transmitted smoothly, and could not be transmitted 
otherwise. If the movement was spasmodic, it was an 
unexplained and, it seems, an inexplicable departure 
from the normal workings of the mechanism. An 
aberration so extraordinary, if it is to lay the basis for a 
verdict, should rest on something firmer than a mere 
descriptive epithet, a summary of the sensations of a 
tense and crowded moment.94 
This language sounds more like the reasoning of a smart juror who is 
working out whether to believe the plaintiff or the amusement park 
about whether the Flopper did more than its usual flopping than a judge 
whose role is to determine if a jury might reasonably have concluded 
otherwise about the existence of a jerk.95 
Tellingly in this regard is that there was corroborating evidence 
in support of plaintiff’s jerk claim; when plaintiff was thrown to the 
belt: “His wife in front and also friends behind him were thrown at the 
same time.”96  In addition, two witnesses, the plaintiff’s fiancé and his 
sister, testified that the belt suddenly jerked.97 
So, the issue becomes whether the plaintiff’s jerk testimony 
should be believed when coupled with the evidence supporting it. The 
defendant’s evidence that a jerk was not possible was persuasive—the 
Flopper was driven by a belt that ran smoothly and could not have 







94 Murphy v. Steeplechase Amusement Co., 166 N.E. 173, 174 (N.Y. 1929). As with Greene 
and other cases discussed above, there is reason to question the accuracy of Judge Cardozo’s 
account of the facts: “An examination of the trial transcript and exhibits in Murphy reveals that 
the story told in Cardozo’s opinion is inaccurate and misleading.” KENNETH W. SIMONS, 
Murphy v. Steeplechase Amusement Co.: While the Timorous Stay Home, the Adventurous 
Ride the Flopper, in TORTS STORIES 179, 182 (Robert L. Rabin & Steven D. Sugarman eds. 
Foundation Press 2003). 
95 Another option would have been granting a new trial based on the weight of the evidence. 
However, that was a determination left largely to the trial judge and we have no indication that 
there was a motion for a new trial made in the trial court. The Court of Appeals did not have 
the authority to review new trial motions. See COHEN, supra note 30, at § 125, p.  346. 
96   Murphy, 166 N.E. at 174. 
97   SIMONS, supra note 94, at 187. 
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one that Cardozo arrogated to the court without a word about the 
proper procedural handling of the matter.98 
We would expect skeptics familiar with Cardozo’s torts 
opinions to be thinking, what about Pokora?99  Pokora, with its 
complement, Baltimore & O.R. Co. v. Goodman,100 are staples in torts 
casebooks. Both cases involve contributory negligence by drivers 
crossing railroad tracks and were decided in the U.S. Supreme Court.101  
Goodman was authored by Justice Holmes and Pokora                     by 
Justice Cardozo.102  Both were pre-Erie when federal courts 
unabashedly made tort law. 
In Goodman, Justice Holmes employed a precept from The 
Common Law103 that addressed the emerging body of tort law. He 
posited that while initially judges would defer to juries about 
negligence, with sufficient experience, courts would develop rules of 
law more specific than the general reasonableness standard and that 
would then enable clearer law and more efficient case resolutions.104 
Holmes adopted a rule in Goodman that required the driver of 
an automobile at an obscured railroad crossing to stop, get out of his 
vehicle, approach the tracks, look both ways and then return to the 
motor vehicle before proceeding or be deemed contributorily negligent 
as a matter of law.105   Of course, this “rule” shifted much authority to 
the court on this issue.  So long as the historical fact of whether the 
driver had exited the vehicle was not in dispute, the Goodman rule 
would resolve the case without the need for a jury. 
Seven years later, after Cardozo succeeded Justice Holmes on 
the Supreme Court, the Court confronted another railroad crossing 
accident.  Although technically limiting Goodman to its facts,106 the 
Court effectively overruled the Goodman rule of contributory 
negligence. 
 
98 Ken Simons, who wrote a piercing assessment of the Murphy case agrees: “Cardozo is 
quick to conclude that the evidence of a sudden jerk is too weak to support the verdict—too 
quick in my view.” SIMONS, supra note 94, at 187-88. 
99   Pokora v. Wabash Ry. Co., 292 U.S. 98 (1934). 
100 275 U.S. 66 (1927). 
101 Pokora, 292 U.S. at 99; Goodman, 275 U.S. at 69. 
102 Id. 
103 OLIVER W. HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 123-24 (1881). 
104 See G. EDWARD WHITE, JUSTICE OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES 161-63 (1993). 
105 Goodman, 275 U.S. at 70. 
106 Pokora, 292 U.S. at 102 (citing facts contained in the court of appeals opinion in Goodman, 
but which were not contained in the Supreme Court’s opinion); see Goodman, 275 U.S. at 
102 n.2. 
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Cardozo explained how getting out and reconnoitering at a 
railroad crossing could, depending on the facts, be more dangerous 
than remaining in one’s vehicle.107  This requires careful attention to 
the facts of each railroad crossing accident, thereby restoring the role 
of the jury to determine those facts as well as the mixed question of 
whether the driver had exercised reasonable care on those facts.108 
Pokora returned to the jury the evaluative assessment of 
whether a driver had exercised reasonable care in negotiating railroad 
tracks, removing that determination from the rule of law crafted by 
Holmes.  Isn’t Pokora jury affirming and therefore inconsistent with 
your theory?, we would expect the skeptic to wonder.109 
Well, yes, Justice Cardozo in Pokora is jury-affirming. And 
this does appear puzzling given the thesis this article pursues. Or, 
perhaps, Pokora represents contrary evidence. Let us tender a 
response—one we think reasonable and in which we are buoyed by the 
fact that another commentator has expressed a similar view. 
Justice Cardozo’s Pokora opinion is not about protecting the 
role of the jury, rather that is merely a consequence of Pokora. In this 
view, we find ourselves largely in agreement with John Goldberg.110 
Nowhere in Pokora do we find a hint that Cardozo believed the jury 
was the appropriate decision maker or even that he felt the Pokora 
decision gave greater authority to the jury in negligence cases was 
worth acknowledging. Thus, we posit that Pokora is a product of 
Cardozo’s pragmatism in judging,111 his distaste for formalism, and his 
attention to contemporary practices—Cardozo appreciated how out- 
of-step Holmes’s rule was with how drivers negotiated railroad 
crossings.112  Indeed, Justice Holmes’ view that those crossing railroad 
107  Pokora, 292 U.S. at 102 (quoting Goodman, 275 U.S. at 70). 
108 And created what Gary Schwartz has characterized as an ethics of particularism about tort 
law—each case is different and careful attention to the facts in the instant case is required. 
RESTATEMENT, supra note 23, at § 8 cmt. c. 
109   John C. P. Goldberg, The Life of the Law, 51 STAN. L. REV. 1419, 1460 (1999).
110  Id. 
111  KAUFMAN, supra note 2, at 218-19. 
112  Indeed, Cardozo acknowledged this view in Law and Literature, referring to imposing a 
duty of vigilance on a guest in another’s car: “I find it hard to imagine a rule more completely 
unrelated to the realities of life. Men situated as the guest in the case I have supposed do not 
act in the way this rule expects and required them to act. . . . The law in charging them with 
such a duty has shaped its rule in disregard of the common standards of conduct, the everyday 
beliefs and practices of the average man whose behavior it assumes to regulate.” SELECTED 
WRITINGS, supra note 3, at 364. We find it notable and significant to our thesis that Cardozo 
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tracks should stop, emerge from the vehicle, perform a 180 degree scan 
of the tracks, then return to their vehicle and proceed is so comical that 
torts students enjoy a good laugh when the standard is articulated in 
class. 
As Bernard Shientag put it many years ago: “The predominant 
characteristics of his philosophy are pragmatic--a flexibility, rather 
than a dogmatic rigidity; a concern with facts and realities and 
consequences, rather than with abstractions and formal rules.113 
Similarly, Leon Green commented that Cardozo was “far more 
interested in the solution of the particular problem than in setting up a 
rule.”114 
 
III. THE STRUCTURE OF JUDGE CARDOZO’S OPINIONS 
 
Up to this point, we have analyzed Cardozo only on a micro 
level, opening up and looking inside individual cases for evidence. 
However, zooming out and comparing Cardozo to the other judges 
who served with him on the Court of Appeals is the next logical step. 
We reviewed every tort case the Court of Appeals heard on appeal that 
implicated the issue of judge-jury allocation during Cardozo’s tenure 
on the court.115   We were able to pinpoint which aspects of Cardozo’s 
characteristics in his opinion-writing were shared by other judges and 
which aspects were peculiar to him. 
To define the search parameters, only tort cases that were tried 
before a jury or granted summary judgment were included. The 
appealed issue had to involve a sufficiency of the evidence question. 
We limited our review to appeals decided between 1917 and 1932.116 
Per curiam and memorandum decisions were excluded.  A total of 16 
opinions by Judge Cardozo and 41 opinions from other judges fit these 
criteria.  We prepared two charts, one for Cardozo’s opinions and the 
other for the opinions of the other Judges, which can be found in  
Appendices A & B at the end of this article. There were three main 
aspects of the opinions that we looked for: (1) procedural history, (2) 
 
said nothing about the role of the jury in this instance with its ability to knock the rough edges 
off of the law. 
113 Bernard L. Shientag, The Opinions and Writings of Judge Benjamin N. Cardozo, 30 
COLUM. L. REV. 597, 601 (1930). 
114 Leon Green, Benjamin Nathan Cardozo, 33 ILL. L. REV. 123, 124 (1938). 
115 See infra Appendix A. 
116 The years Benjamin Cardozo served on the New York Court of Appeals. See KAUFMAN, 
supra note 2. 
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language that referred to jury involvement, such as “the jury found,”117 
and (3) the overall deference to the jury reflected in the opinion. 
First, procedural history included discussion of what happened 
in the lower courts, so as to frame the basis for the appeal and the role 
of the Court in deciding the matter. Thus, if summary judgment was 
granted in the trial court on the ground that plaintiff had no evidence 
of causation, or because plaintiff was contributorily negligent as a 
matter of law, those histories reveal a potential judge-jury issue on 
appeal. How much time the judge spent on it and where in the opinion 
the procedural history was located were taken into consideration. 
To start with a comparison of numbers, only 50%118 of 
Cardozo’s opinions included any mention of the procedural 
background, while 87.8%119 of the other judges’ opinions dealt with 
procedural history (p = .0066). The majority of opinions had the 
procedural history placed toward the beginning or within the first few 
paragraphs.120  Probing further into the eight cases in which Cardozo 
did include procedural background, there is a sense of grudging 
acknowledgement rather than recognition of its critical role in framing 
the appeal.121  Several of the cases only had a partial history, while 
others buried it later in the opinion or split it up over several 
paragraphs.122  On the other hand, almost all of the other judges’ 
opinions containing procedural history placed it within the first or 
second paragraph.123  An early and thorough recital of the procedural 
history tells the reader what the issue is and the role of the court in 
order to frame properly the substantive decision. Cardozo seemed to 




117 Touris v. Brewster & Co., 139 N.E. 249, 250 (N.Y. 1923). 
118 See Cardozo Comparison Chart, infra Appendix A. 
119 See Judge Comparison Chart, infra Appendix B. 
120 See Horton v. New York C. R. Co., 142 N.E. 345 (N.Y. 1923), see also Cadby v. Hill, 
132 N.E. 104 (N.Y. 1921). 
121 Compare Stern v. Int’l R.R. Co., 115 N.E. 759, 760 (N.Y. 1917) (Judge Cardozo, at the 
outset of the opinion, states “[Plaintiff] has obtained a judgment against three defendants” with 
no indication as to whether the trial was a jury trial or bench trial until two paragraphs later) 
with Orlando v. Pioneer Barber Towel Supply Co., 146 N.E. 621 (N.Y. 1925) (Judge Pound 
starts with a sentence summarizing the case, then goes directly into the procedural background. 
Several further mentions to the lower court’s decision are made throughout the opinion.). 
122 See Adams v. Bullock, 125 N.E. 93 (N.Y. 1919); see also Coons v. N.Y. Tel. Co., 162 
N.E. 578 (N.Y. 1928). 
123 See Lopes v. Linch, 115 N.E. 15 (N.Y. 1917); see also Muller v. Hillenbrand, 125 N.E. 
808 (N.Y. 1920). 
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decision.124  Overall, Cardozo’s attention to the case’s procedural 
background reflects comparative indifference to it and concomitantly 
identifying and framing any judge-jury issue.125 
Jury-friendly indicators are words often found in opinions that 
judges use to recognize the role of the jury in making factual findings 
based on making credibility assessments and drawing inferences as 
well as the deference given to its judgments on mixed questions that 
are denominated as matters of fact. Examples of some of these 
common indicators include “[t]he jury could (or might) find,”126 
“taking all reasonable inferences in favor of . . . ,” “only if evidence 
permits,”127 and “[t]he jury was entitled to believe.”128  Indicators are 
evidence that the judge, in writing his opinion, acknowledged the role 
of the jury and the legal guidelines within which judgment as a matter 
of law is appropriate. Indicators are also a way for the judge to remind 
the reader of the appropriate standard of review. Indicators that 
highlight the judgment as a matter of law standard might say “from the 
testimony offered in behalf of the plaintiff the jury could have found  . 
. .”129 or “the facts determinative of the question presented to us, as the 
jury might have found them . . . .”130  Judge Cardozo often failed to 
make use of these indicators; they made an appearance in only 
43.8%131 of his opinions, as opposed to the 80.5%132 (p = .016) 
appearance rate in other Judges’ opinions. Cardozo’s opinions 
acknowledged the jury’s factfinding role significantly less than his 
legal counterparts did. 
To take our analysis a step further, there was only one case 
written by other judges in which the opinion lacked both procedural 
history and jury indicators.133   The rest of the cases made mention of 
the jury and the role it has in deciding factual matters, whether                    




124  See Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R. Co., 162 N.E. 99 (N.Y. 1928). 
125  See Perry v. Rochester Lime Co., 113 N.E. 529 (N.Y. 1916). 
126  Tantillo v. Goldstein Bros. Amusement Co., 162 N.E. 82, 83 (N.Y. 1928). 
127  Loktich v. Bethlehem Eng’g Corp., 152 N.E. 253, 254 (N.Y. 1926). 
128  Raolaslovic v. N.Y. Cent. R.R. Co., 156 N.E. 625, 627 (N.Y. 1927). 
129 Nowakowski v. N.Y. & N. Shore Traction Co., 114 N.E. 1042 (N.Y. 1917) (Chase, J.). 
130  Pyne v. Cazenovia Canning. Co., 115 N.E. 438, 438 (N.Y. 1917) (Collin, J.). 
131  See Cardozo Comparison Chart, infra Appendix A. 
132  See Judge Comparison Chart, infra Appendix B. 
133  See McLoughlin v. N.Y. Edison Co., 169 N.E. 227 (N.Y. 1929) (Kellogg, J.). 
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opinion.  On the other hand, only 69%134 (p = .016) of Cardozo’s 
opinions made some form of reference to the jury.  These numbers 
provide important evidence that Cardozo’s approach to appealed jury 
decisions was different from and less jury-oriented than his peers. 
Finally, our gestalt sense of our comparative reading of these 
opinions is that opinions by other judges made clear from their 
language at an early stage of the opinion that the court was deciding an 
appeal from a jury decision on a potential question of fact.135  Only a 
few times was a second read-through necessary to determine the exact 
layout of the case. However, when reading Cardozo opinions, multiple 
read-throughs were necessary and many cases read like de novo 
reviews.136  Overall, the lack of procedural background and recognition 
of the role the jury caused backtracking to lower opinions to gather 
procedural and factual information,137 an effort not required when 
reading other judges’ opinions. 
Taking a brief step outside the realm of solely torts decisions, 
Cardozo’s disregard of jury determinations is an interesting contrast to 
Mark Graber’s (and others’) assessment about Cardozo’s deference to 
administrative agencies.138  One might have thought that Cardozo, 
despite his extraordinary people skills, would have given little 
deference to anyone, at least in his professional life. 
Yet he did protect and defer to administrative agencies, which 
he thought necessary and important to conducting the business of 
government.139  In a case after Cardozo joined the U.S. Supreme Court 
involving confusion over different grades and names of pine lumber, 
some lumber producers modified their labels voluntarily to avoid 
confusion, while others resisted.140  The FTC investigated and found 
unfair competition by the latter dealers and issued a remedial order, 





134  See Cardozo Comparison Chart, infra Appendix A. 
135  See generally Mintz v. Int’l R.R. Co., 124 N.E. 893 (N.Y. 1919). 
136  See generally Fiocco v. Carver, 137 N.E. 309 (N.Y. 1922). 
137  Perry v. Rochester Lime Co., 113 N.E. 529 (N.Y. 1916). Here Cardozo fails to make any 
mention of the procedural history of the case. 
138 See generally supra note 8.  
139 See, e.g., Proceedings of the Bar and Officers of the Supreme Court of the United States 
in Memory of Benjamin Nathan Cardozo 54-58 (Nov. 26, 1938) (statement of Dean G. 
Acheson). 
140   Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Algoma Lumber Co., 291 U.S. 67 (1934). 
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The findings of the Commission as to facts, if supported 
by testimony, shall be conclusive. . . . The Court of 
Appeals, though professing adherence to this mandate, 
honored it, we think, with lip service only. In form the 
court determined that the finding of unfair competition 
had no support whatever. In fact what the court did was 
to make its own appraisal of the testimony, picking and 
choosing for itself among uncertain and conflicting 
inferences.141 
The irony and inconsistency of his deference to agency 
factfinding contrasted with his treatment of juries is palpable.142   Why 
the difference?  Might it be that deference to expertise was consistent 
with Cardozo’s world view while deference to lay judgments was not? 
We don’t know, but this seems one plausible explanation.143 
 
IV. JUDGE CARDOZO’S EXTRA-JUDICIAL WRITINGS 
 
We now assess Cardozo’s own unencumbered words about the 
jury.  What did Cardozo say about his views on the role of the jury in 
resolving non-equity civil cases? The jury was no stranger to Cardozo. 
Although the bulk of his practice was in appellate courts, Cardozo tried 
a substantial number of jury cases before his appointment to the New 
York Supreme Court.144  And a considerable number of appeals 
confronted by the Court of Appeals during Cardozo’s tenure began 
with a jury verdict. For as thoughtful and probing a mind as Cardozo’s 
it is hard to believe he had not confronted and formed opinions  about 
 
 
141   Id. at 73. 
142 We have not found any case in which Judge Cardozo did something similar with regard 
to protecting a jury’s determination. 
143 Unfortunately, there is no way to further investigate as Cardozo never revealed his views 
about the jury. See infra text accompanying notes 149-150. 
144 That’s not precisely the way that Andrew Kaufman put it in his biography: after explaining 
the cases his three-partner firm had in the trial courts, Kaufman concludes “Cardozo must have 
handled some of this trial work. . . .” KAUFMAN, supra note 2, at 62. Kaufman has personally 
assured us that Cardozo had significant jury trial experience and that those who claim 
otherwise, e.g., Proceedings of the Bar and Officers of the Supreme Court of the United States 
in Memory of Benjamin Nathan Cardozo 96 (Nov. 26, 1938) (statement of Chief Justice 
Hughes “at the bar, he was spared the stormy conflicts of jury trials and the contests which 
evoked passion and animosities”), are wrong. See email communication from Andrew 
Kaufman to Michael D. Green (June 22, 2017). Judge Posner also reports that Cardozo was “a 
highly successful trial lawyer” but cites no source in support. POSNER, supra note 2, at 2. 
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the appropriate role of the jury in contemporary dispute resolution.145 
What were they? 
       In three series of lectures, each series published as a book, and 
another collection of speeches and lectures published in a fourth book 
entitled, Law and Literature,146 “Cardozo tried,” in the words of 
Andrew Kaufman, “to describe and defend what he did as a judge.”147  
 Cardozo ranged over the jurisprudential debates of the day as 
formalism was yielding to the realists.  He considered the role of policy 
in common lawmaking and how to determine the mores of 
contemporary society. Cardozo addressed consideration of other 
sources of law, including the legislature and made the case for the 
formation of an organization to rationalize the welter of common law 
precedent that reflected incoherence and created uncertainty—what 
was to become the ALI. He addressed negligence, its objective nature, 
the need for line drawing in assessing whether a party was negligent, 
the frequency that mixed questions of law and fact need to be 
decided,148 and the way that the objective standard for determining 
negligence deviates from an individualized assessment of wrongdoing 
by the defendant. 
Throughout all his cogitations about law and judging, Cardozo 
used the word “jury” but twice, once, irrelevantly, during a story to 
explain the “important truth” that our system relies on the notion that 
judges are learned in the law. The story involved a trial judge who got 
distracted at the end of a case during instructions and thus “forgot to 
tell the jury anything else [about the applicable law].”149 The second 
time he used the word “jury” occurs in the course of discussing the 
concept of proximate cause and the absence of any definitive test for 
its determination. All we get are signposts that might direct one in this 
determination, Cardozo explains. Cardozo expresses approval of 
Professor Henry Edgerton’s views on this matter150 but adds, “I do not 
 
145 Leon Green wrote in 1930 of the significance of the jury and its relation with appellate 
courts as “the dominant idea of Anglo-American courthouse government. The whole of our 
procedure is built about it. . . .” He went on to claim that the strongest supporters of the jury 
are judges. See LEON GREEN, JUDGE AND JURY 375-76 (1930). 
146  SELECTED WRITINGS, supra note 3, at 338 
147   KAUFMAN, supra note 2, at 222. 
148  SELECTED WRITINGS, supra note 3, at 175-76. 
149  SELECTED WRITINGS, supra note 3, at 351-52. 
150 Henry W. Edgerton, Legal Cause, 72 U. PA. L. REV. 348 (1924). What Edgerton said 
about the jury and Cardozo’s coy demurrer on the issue is notable. Edgerton wrote with regard 
to proximate cause “[G]ood sense requires that large latitude be left to the judgment and 
intuition of the trier of fact; the limit of this latitude is the point beyond  which  the judgment 
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say that I would follow him in all his conclusions as to the relative 
function of judge and jury.151  What does Cardozo add to explain his 
difference with Edgerton and perhaps thereby shed some light on 
where he stands on the jury?  Nothing. 
Thus, in all his words about law and judging and the struggle 
of a judge to remain true to principles that sometimes were not readily 
discernable, the role of the jury, its genius and disadvantages, and the 
allocation of decision making between court and jury were not 
important enough for Cardozo to address. 
 
V. INTERNAL COURT   MEMORANDA 
 
The internal processing of cases in the Court of Appeals when 
Judge Cardozo sat on the court began with the filing of the parties’ 
briefs.  Oral argument followed, and after argument, the court held a 
conference at which one judge was assigned primary responsibility for 
each case.  The conference also addressed, for each of those cases, the 
necessity of a written opinion or, on the other hand, whether the case 
could be affirmed without a written opinion, typically in a brief per 
curiam opinion.  In the latter case, the judge assigned to the case would 
prepare a memorandum for the rest of the court summarizing the facts 
and explaining why, based on the law, a written opinion was 
unnecessary.  These memoranda were for internal court use only and 
were entirely confidential until Andy Kaufman was able to convince 
Sol Wachtler, then the Chief Judge of the Court of Appeals, to make 
them available for the biography that Kaufman was writing.152  Today, 
those memoranda are made available to researchers who can 
demonstrate a legitimate need for access. 
Those memoranda provide the support for Andy Kaufman’s 
assessment of Judge Cardozo’s approach to the jury.153  At Kaufman’s 
urging and with his help, we managed to review relevant memoranda, 
first by identifying them from Kaufman’s handwritten notes at the time 
he was reviewing the memoranda.  We chose every case that, from 
Kaufman’s notes, it appeared that Cardozo had written a memorandum 
 
 
and intuition of the court tell it that a reasonable man would not go.” He proceeded to justify 
the inconsistent outcomes that will result from leaving this judgment to the jury as a factual 
matter rather than entombing such a decision in a legal ruling. Id. at 372-73 (footnote omitted). 
151   SELECTED WRITINGS, supra note 3, at 305. 
152   See KAUFMAN, supra note 2, at x-xi. 
153   See supra note 24 and accompanying text. 
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about a tort case in which a judge-jury issue might have existed.  We 
then were able to obtain access to those memoranda at the New York 
State Archives. 
We found 21 cases that met our criteria: tort cases with a judge- 
jury issue decided by the Court of Appeals between 1914 and 1932 
without a written opinion in which Judge Cardozo had been assigned 
primary responsibility for the case and therefore had authored a 
memorandum to the rest of the court with his recommendation for an 
affirmance without opinion. Curiously, we found seven cases decided 
between 1914 and 1918 and fifteen decided between 1922 and 1933, 
but no cases in the years between 1918 and 1922; we have no 
explanation for that gap. Virtually all cases involve an institutional 
defendant (railroads were common) appealing a jury verdict and trial 
court judgment for the plaintiff that was affirmed by the Appellate 
Division, although frequently by a divided court.154  In all cases save 
two, Cardozo appears comfortable with the jury verdict or at least does 
not express disagreement.155 
There are a substantial number of cases that provide ample 
support for Andy Kaufman’s assessment of Cardozo’s deference to the 
jury during the early years of Cardozo’s judicial career. Typical was 
 
154  Recall that, until the 1925 revisions to the New York Constitution, the Court of Appeals 
did not have jurisdiction to review a unanimous Appellate Division decision on a matter 
involving sufficiency of the evidence. 
155  One exception is Schott v. U.S. Printing Co., in which Judge Cardozo wrote:  I 
do not feel at all satisfied that the defendant omitted any precaution which 
it ought reasonably to have taken. But I think that the responsibility 
for any injustice that may have been done must rest upon the jury. The 
case was fairly submitted to them. They were told that they must find for 
the defendant if the absence happened through failure to adjust the guard. 
They were told that no guard was to be expected except one that was 
reasonably adapted for the practical operation of the machine. They were 
told that if this was the first time that the suggestion of such danger came 
to the defendant, the failure to provide against it was not a breach of duty, 
more than this could hardly have been asked for. 
The other is Sanders v. New York Cent. R. Co., 240 N.Y. 639 (N.Y. 1925) (per curiam) in 
which Cardozo wrote about the factual causal connection between plaintiff’s having been hit 
by a heavy curtain in a locomotive and his apoplexy suffered the following day: 
I have a great deal of doubt whether it [the apoplexy was caused by the 
blow]. Again, however, the question is one of fact, and beyond our power 
of review. 
The “beyond our power” statement by Judge Cardozo likely refers to the constitutional 
limitations on the Court reviewing a unanimous Appellate Division determination on 
sufficiency of the evidence that was in effect at the time of Sanders. The Appellate Division’s 
affirmance of the Supreme Court was unanimous. Sanders v. New York Cent. R. Co., 212 
A.D. 849 (N.Y. App. Div. 1925). 
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what he wrote in his memorandum addressing Gorman v. Brooklyn 
Heights R. Co.,156 a case involving a jury verdict for a pedestrian who 
was hit by defendant’s trolley while crossing the street. The issue on 
appeal was contributory negligence by the plaintiff. Plaintiff and 
defendant’s evidence conflicted, and Cardozo wrote: “Accepting the 
plaintiff’s version as we must for the purposes of this appeal . . . ,” and 
continued on to say “that the question of the plaintiff’s contributory 
negligence was for the jury.”  In another case, he wrote: “I think a jury 
would be fully warranted in holding that the narrative of the 
defendant’s witnesses was suspicious and in refusing to accept it.”157 
In general, these memoranda reflect just the sort of deference to jury 
fact finding in the face of conflicting evidence and jury judgments 
about mixed questions of fact and law that judges typically reflect. 
However, in several cases beginning in 1924, Cardozo’s 
assessments trend away from jury deference and sound more like 
Cardozo qua juror. He wrote about a case158 involving a train accident 
in which the facts were similar to Pokora v. Wabash Railway Co.,159 
and in which the issue was also plaintiff’s contributory negligence. 
Cardozo assessed the defendant’s claim that plaintiff had a clear view 
when he was 25 feet from the locomotive, as one witness testified, a 
fact strongly supporting contributing negligence: “Anyone who tries to 
measure the distance of 25 feet with the eye will appreciate how wide 
of the mark his estimate is likely to be,” instead of simply deferring to 
the jury’s determination that plaintiff was not contributorily negligent.  
In another case, in which defendant raised a cockamamie theory about 
how plaintiff fell down an elevator shaft that would have exonerated the 
defendant, Cardozo wrote: “I think the circumstantial evidence is 
abundant that he fell [contrary to defendant’s theory] at the open shaft 
upon the floor described.” A handful of other cases reveal Cardozo 
immersing himself in the record and analyzing the case from that 
perspective, including being willing to overturn the jury’s finding, 
unlike the earlier cases that reflected deference. This shift occurs 
chronologically, the stronger evidence for Cardozo’s lack of deference 
appearing in the cases beginning in 1924 as mentioned above. 
 
 
156   108 N.E. 1095 (N.Y. 1915). 
157   Albano v. J. F. Tapley & Co., 138 N.E. 431 (1922). 
158   Shapiro v. New York Cent. R. Co., 147 N.E. 202 (N.Y. 1924). 
159   292 U.S. 98 (1934). 
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For the missing years of 1918 to 1922, we took a closer look at 
the five tort opinions Cardozo published in that period to see if his 
attitude towards providing jury decisions with deference would be 
similar to those in his internal memorandum surrounding that gap. 
What we found were three cases where Cardozo affirmed the original 
jury ruling and two cases where he did not. 
What do we make of the evidence provided in these 
memoranda?  First, it is clear that Cardozo understood the role of the 
jury with regard to factual matters. Second, there are indisputable 
instances in which he respected that role, contrary to what we describe 
in his written opinions.  Third, we might venture the theory that in cases 
in which Cardozo was not invested—recall these are cases in which he 
was recommending affirmance without a written opinion—Cardozo 
was willing to give the jury its due.  Even then, we find instances in 
which Cardozo reverted to his super-juror role and could not resist 
parsing the record and making his own judgment, although in nearly 
every case that judgment conformed to the jury’s judgment. 
Yet we do not find this evidence sufficient to negate the 
judgment we make based on his written opinions. Cardozo was willing 
to adjust the facts to suit his purposes, regardless of what the jury might 
have been justified in finding. He was willing to substitute his 
judgment for the jury’s when he felt strongly enough about the matter. 
Perhaps this is an overstatement, but we think it best captures the 
various strands of evidence we found: When the going gets tough, 
Cardozo was willing to take significant liberties with the jury’s role; in 
cases in which it was easy going, Cardozo was amenable to giving the 
jury.its.due.   
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APPENDIX  A 




 Case Vote Result Issue 
 
Perry v. Rochester 
Lime Co., 113 N.E. 




Is there sufficient conflicting 
evidence to award a new trial? 
 
Stern v. Int'l R.R. Co., 




Is there sufficient evidence 
to sustain the jury verdict? 
 
Pellegrino v. Clarence 
L. Smith Co., 123 N.E. 
153 (N.Y. 1919) 
7-0 Affirmed 
Jury 
Is there sufficient evidence to 
sustain the jury verdict and is 
there enough evidence to show 
contributory negligence as a 
matter of law? 
 
Adams v. Bullock, 125 
N.E. 93 (N.Y. 1919) 
7-0 Reversed 
Jury 
Is there sufficient evidence 
to sustain the jury 
verdict? 
 
Nicholson v. Greeley 
Square Hotel Co., 125 
N.E. 541 (N.Y. 1919) 
7-0 Affirmed 
Jury 
Is there enough evidence to 
sustain the jury verdict and is 
there enough evidence to show 
contributory negligence as a 
matter of law? 
 
Ward v. Clark, 133 
N.E. 443 (N.Y. 1921) 
6-0-1 Affirmed 
Jury 
Is there sufficient evidence 
to sustain the jury 
verdict? 
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No mention of the role of 
the jury or the lower court 
decision. 





"jury had the right 
to find" 
Mentions the jury and its 
role only a few times for a 
long opinion, but does give 























Does not mention the jury. 
Cardozo's decision is a 'no 
reasonable jury could find' 















1) Covers entire 
procedural background 
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Woloszynowski v. 7-0 Reversed Is there sufficient evidence 
to N.Y. Cent. R.R. Co.,  Jury sustain the jury verdict? 
172 N.E. 471    
(N.Y. 1930)    
Greene v. Sibley, 




Is there sufficient evidence 
to sustain the jury verdict? 
Case Vote Result Issue 
Fiocco v. Carver, 




Is there sufficient evidence to 
sustain the jury verdict? 
Hinz v. Eighth Ave. 
R.R. Co., 152 N.E. 
475 (N.Y. 1926) 
6-0-1 New Trial Is there sufficient evidence to 
sustain the jury verdict and is 
there enough evidence to show 
contributory negligence as a 
matter of law? 
Baker v.  Lehigh 
Valley R.R. Co.,  




Is there sufficient evidence 
to sustain the jury verdict? 
Palsgraf v. Long 
Island R.R. Co., 




Is there sufficient evidence 
to sustain the jury verdict? 
Coons v. N.Y. Tel. Co., 




Is there sufficient evidence 
to sustain the jury verdict? 
Murphy v. Steeplechase 
Amusement Co., 




Is there sufficient evidence 
to sustain the jury verdict? 
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No mention of jury. Frames 
argument around "no reasonable 
basis" but fails to embrace the 
"jury could find" language. Also 
no mention of reasonable 
inferences in favor of the party 






language with mentions of 
jury throughout. 
Procedural History Indicators Notes 
1) Brief mention of 
procedural background 
 
2) First paragraph 
 
None 
No mention of jury past 
procedural history. Cardozo s 
decision is a ‘no reasonable 
jury could find’ but never says 
so. 
 
1) Covers entire procedural 
background 
 
2) second paragraph 
 “the jury might have found”  
“jury might determine” 
“jury might say”  
“jury should say” 
 
Strong jury-friendly 






“jury must decide” 




language, talks about 






Only mentions jury once 
to say that sometimes 
inferences are for the jury, 










Only mentions jury during 
partial recitation of 
procedural history. 








Reader doesn’t know that it 
was a jury case until the final 
paragraph. Mentions how 
there is “no adequate basis for 
finding…” but otherwise no 
other homage to the standard or 
the procedural history. 
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Case Judge Cardozo 
Vote 
Issue 
Larkin v. N.Y. 
Tel. Co.,  




Is there sufficient 
evidence to sustain 





N.Y. & N. Shore 
Traction Co.,  









Is there sufficient 
evidence to show 
contributory 
negligence as a 






Lopes v. Linch,  









Is there sufficient 
evidence to show 
contributory 
negligence as a 
matter of law? 
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Attentive to procedural 
history, and uses a great deal 
of jury-friendly language 






2) Second and 
third paragraph 
"the jury had a 
right to find" 
 
"the jury could 
have found" 
Uses a great deal of jury-
friendly language through 
entire opinion.  
 
"We must assume from the 
record that the jury had a right 
to find that the trolley car was 
run 'fast' and that the 
motorman did not blow the 
whistle or ring the bell. From 
the testimony offered in behalf 










While there are no buzzwords, 
speaks about the difference 
between questions of law and 
fact. Talks about the jury's role 
at least four times. 
 
"It is not easy to fix the exact 
boundary between the question 
of contributory negligence as a 
question of law and that of 
contributory negligence as a 
question of fact." 
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Case Judge Cardozo 
Vote 
Issue 
Escher v. Buffalo 
& Lake Erie 
Traction Co., 115 
N.E. 445  
(N.Y. 1917) 
McLaughlin Concur 
Is there sufficient 
evidence to 




Canning. Co., 115 
N.E. 438 
 (N.Y. 1917) 
Collin Concur 
Is there sufficient 
evidence to 





Brewing Co., 116 
N.E. 991  
(N.Y. 1917) 
Collin Concur 
Is there sufficient 
evidence to 






Ochs v. Woods, 




Is there sufficient 
evidence to 
sustain the jury 
verdict? 
 
Turner v. Crystal 
Film Co., 121 




Is there sufficient 
evidence to 
sustain the jury 
verdict? 
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"it was for the 
jury to say" 
Talk's about the jury's role 
and lists conflicting evidence 
that should be given to a jury 
to determine. 






the jury might 
have found 
them" 
Brief mention of jury 
throughout opinion. 






the jury might 
have found 
them" 
Walks through conflicting 
evidence and uses strong 
language to show a lack of 
evidence such as "barren," 
"no proof," and 
"inconceivable." 
















Strong jury-friendly language 
throughout. Mentions the 
conflicting evidence that 
requires a jury decision. 












Frames the facts and 
argument around the 
evidence as "the jury might 
have found." The entire 
opinion was very jury-
friendly 
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Burgard, 122 N.E. 
257 (N.Y. 1919) 
 
Hogan Concur 
Is there sufficient 
evidence to 
sustain the jury 
verdict? 
Elias v. Lehigh 
Valley R.R. Co., 
123 N.E. 73 
 (N.Y. 1919) 
 
Andrews Concur 
Is there sufficient 
evidence to show 
contributory 
negligence as a 












Is there sufficient 
evidence to 




Mintz v. Int'l R.R. 




Is there sufficient 
evidence to 









Is there sufficient 
evidence to 
sustain the jury 
verdict? 
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Does not mention the 
jury until the decision is 
rendered in the opinion. 
Mostly a recitation of 
the facts and a few small 
paragraphs of analysis. 
None 
"it was for the 
jury to say" 
 
"may be 
considered by a 
jury" 
Gets to a brief jury 
discussion after facts are 
laid out. Very 
streamlined opinion. 
1) Covers entire 
procedural 
background 
2) First paragraph 
"evidence 
warrants no such 
conclusion" 
Doesn't mention jury by 
name other than 
procedural history. 
Judge enters a JMOL 
and uses language to 
show that no reasonable 
person could find 
otherwise. 
1) Covers entire 
procedural 
background 
2) First paragraph 








1) Covers entire 
procedural 
background 
2) First paragraph 
"the evidence 
…justified the 
jury in finding" 
Short opinion, limited 
jury discussion. But, 
frames analysis around 
jury role. 
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Is there sufficient 
evidence to sustain 
the jury verdict? 
Campbell v. 
Richmond Light 
& R.R. Co., 127 





Is there sufficient 
evidence to sustain 
the jury verdict? 
 
Christensen v. 
James S. Hannon, 
Inc., 129 N.E. 
655 (N.Y. 1920) 
Andrews Concur 
Is there sufficient 
evidence to show 
contributory 
negligence as a 
matter of law? 
 
 
Ford v. McAdoo, 




Is there sufficient 
evidence to sustain 
the jury verdict? 
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"clearly for the jury to 
decide" 
Speaks directly about the 
burden of proof and the jury's 
role up front in the opinion. 
 
"Assuming as we must, 
therefore, the truth of the 
plaintiff's story, giving him 
the benefit of all the 
inferences to which a jury 
might say he is entitled and 
resolving all disputed points 
in his favor, we must 
determine whether this 
conclusion was justified, or 
whether there was involved a 
question of fact." 
None "the jury might find" 
Uses jury-friendly language 
throughout opinion despite 
lack of procedural history.  





"it is generally for the 
jury to say" 









"there is no evidence 
to show" 
No direct references or use of 
other jury indicators. Had to 
infer that the ruling was a 
JMOL. 
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Cadby v. Hill, 




Is there sufficient 
evidence to sustain 
the jury verdict? 
 
 
Grulich v. Paine, 




Is there sufficient 
evidence to show 
contributory 
negligence as a 
matter of law? 
 
Riley v. Standard 
Oil Co., 132 N.E. 
97 (N.Y. 1921) 
 
Andrews Concur 
Is there sufficient 
evidence to sustain 
the jury verdict? 
 
 
Singer v. Erie 
Railroad Co., 132 









Is there sufficient 
evidence to sustain 
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1) Covers entire 
procedural 
background 
2) First and 
second paragraph 
"the jury might 
have credited the 
evidence" 
 
"the jury might 
find" 
Mentions multiple times 
that the issue before the 
court is one for the jury. 










facts as the jury 
could have found 
them" 
Mentions the jury 
multiple times 
throughout opinion. 
1) Covers entire 
procedural 
background 
2) First paragraph 
"as the jury have 
said" 
Short opinion, makes 
references to the jury 
and its role often. 
1) Brief mention 
of procedural 
background 
2) First paragraph 
None 
Gives deference to jury 
several times.  
 
"We do not see how it is 
possible to permit a jury 
to say that intestate was 
vigilant or that he 
exercised any care at 
all." 
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Wardrop v. Santi 
Moving & 
Express Co., 135 
N.E. 272  
(N.Y. 1922) 
Andrews Concur 
Is there sufficient 
evidence to sustain 





Brewster & Co., 




Is there sufficient 
evidence to sustain 





Horton v. New 
York C. R. Co., 




Is there sufficient 
evidence to show 
contributory 
negligence as a 
matter of law? 
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Strong jury-friendly language 
throughout.  
 
"Under these circumstances we 
cannot say that he was guilty of 
negligence as a matter of law" 







Strong jury-friendly language 
throughout.  
 
"To permit the jury to find 
defendant negligent, under the 
facts here stated, and which are 
substantially uncontradicted, 
would be to make the owner of 
an automobile liable beyond 
reason and common sense." 






A lot of strong jury-friendly 
language throughout entire 
opinion.  
 
"I cannot find in the acts of 
[plaintiff], as I have given them 
above, any evidence that he 
violated section 53-a of the 
Railroad Law, and I find 
nothing in the entire case to 
justify the courts in saying so 
as a matter of law. Whether he 
did was a question for the jury." 
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Orlando v. Pioneer 
Barber Towel 
Supply Co.,  
146 N.E. 621  
(N.Y. 1925) 
Pound Concur 
Is there sufficient 
evidence to rule on 





Lumber & Supply 
Co., 147 N.E. 77 
(N.Y. 1925) 
Crane Concur 
Is there a question 
of fact for the jury 
to decide? 
 
Hyman v. N.Y. 
Cent. R.R. Co., 
147 N.E. 613 
(N.Y. 1925) 
Crane Concur 
Is there a question 
of fact for the jury 
to decide? 
 
Nalli v. Peters, 
149 N.E. 343 
(N.Y. 1925) 
Crane Concur 
Is there sufficient 
evidence to sustain 




Corp., 152 N.E. 
253 (N.Y. 1926) 
Lehman Concur 
Is there sufficient 
evidence to sustain 
the jury verdict? 
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Frames the entire analysis 
around "whether as a matter of 
law the presumption was 
overcome." Strong jury-
friendly language. 
1) Covers entire 
procedural 
background 
2) Directly after 
facts 
"jury did not 
believe." 
Speaks about jury throughout 
decision, and explains there 
was no question of fact for the 
jury to rule on. 






the jury to 
pass on" 
Constantly mentions jury's role 
versus judge's role in 
determining whether the issue 
was one of fact or law. 






might find, or 
reasonably 
infer" 
Frames question around the power 
of the jury and mentions jury 
twice during very short opinion. 
None 
"only if the 
evidence 
permits" 
Doesn't mention the jury. Frames 
argument around the lack of 
evidence. 
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Is there sufficient 
evidence to sustain 






N.Y. Cent. R.R. 




Is there sufficient 
evidence to sustain 
the jury verdict? 
 
 
Shuman v. Hall, 




Is there sufficient 
evidence to sustain 










Is there sufficient 
evidence to sustain 
the jury verdict? 
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No mention of jury. 
 
"when we come to the reversal of 
the judgment on the facts, the 
evidence so clearly sustains this 
disposition that we cannot and 









was such as to 
justify the jury 
in believing" 
 




"for the jury to 
decide" 
Constantly refers to the jury 
throughout opinion. Great 








Strong jury-friendly language in 











could and did 
find" 
Spatters of jury references 
throughout opinion. 
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Sandler v. Garrison, 




Is there sufficient 
evidence to sustain 




N.Y., New Haven 
& Hartford R.R. 






Is there sufficient 
evidence to sustain 
the jury verdict? 
 
McLoughlin v. 
N.Y. Edision Co., 







Is there sufficient 
evidence to sustain 
the jury verdict? 
 
 
Reinzi v. Tilyou, 




Is there sufficient 
evidence to show 
contributory 
negligence as a 
matter of law? 
 
 
Harriman v. N.Y., 
Chi. & St. Louis 
R.R. Co., 171 




Is there sufficient 
evidence to sustain 
the jury verdict? 
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1) Brief mention 
of procedural 
background 
2) First paragraph 
"No proof 
whatsoever" 
Doesn't mention the jury, 
but spends a lot of time 
discussing the severe lack 
of evidence. 
1) Covers entire 
procedural 
background 
2) First paragraph 
"from 
conflicting 
evidence the jury 
could find" 
 
"the jury must be 
presumed to 
have found" 
Talks about the 
conflicting evidence and 
refers to the jury's role 
often. 
None None 
Doesn't mention jury until 
judgement is rendered. 
Uses a lot of language 
such as "could be 









from which the 
jury might find" 
Spends some time 
discussing when the 
evidence rises to the level 
of being able to render a 
JMOL compared to 
leaving the issue for the 
jury. 










"the jury was 
justified in 
finding" 
Strong jury language 
throughout opinion. 
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